On 2026-05-20, an exploit hit Haveno-based trading software and the RetoSwap instance built on it. Monero's protocol, cryptography, and consensus were not affected — the issue was in the trading layer's message handling, not the XMR chain. If you hold or swap Monero, your coins and the network kept working normally throughout.
TL; DR: Monero was not hacked. A trade-coordination flaw in Haveno-based software let an attacker forge acknowledgement messages on the RetoSwap instance. The XMR protocol itself is unaffected.
Lo que realmente pasó
Haveno is open-source software for peer-to-peer Monero trading. RetoSwap is one instance built on that codebase. The incident was confined to that trading layer — not the Monero blockchain.
According to the incident report shared by network operators, the attacker sent forged acknowledgement messages that the trading software accepted as valid. That let trades settle in the attacker's favour without the matching counterparty action.
Reporting from the community put the loss at an estimated 7,000 XMR, with the first malicious activity around 02:31 UTC on 2026-05-20. Treat those figures as provisional community estimates until a formal postmortem is published.
Haveno network operators were advised to halt trading, and the RetoSwap instance suspended operations. The Monero base layer kept producing blocks the entire time.
Was Monero itself hacked? No — here's the distinction
The XMR protocol — ring signatures, stealth addresses, RingCT, the consensus rules — was never in scope for this incident. None of those were broken.
What broke was the Postulación coordinating peer-to-peer trades. That is a software-integration bug, the same class of issue that affects any app sitting on top of a chain.
- The chain layer — Monero's protocol and cryptography. Unaffected.
- The trading layer — Haveno-based coordination software. This is where the forged-acknowledgement flaw lived.
- The instance layer — RetoSwap, a specific deployment. This is what suspended operations.
Conflating these three is the most common error in coverage of this incident. The bug was at layer two, on a specific deployment at layer three.
How this compares to a non-custodial swap
| Característica | Peer-to-peer trading software | Intercambio de fantasmas |
|---|---|---|
| Cuenta / KYC | Varies by instance | Ninguno requerido |
| Custodia | Funds locked in trade protocol | Paso sin custodia |
| Soporta monedas | Limitada | 1,600+ pairs live |
| Precios | Order-book / negotiated | Floating rate from aggregated liquidity |
| Finalización típica | Varíable | Median ~8 minutes |
Different designs carry different failure modes. Peer-to-peer trade protocols depend on multi-step message coordination; a swap service routes a single pass-through. Neither model is immune to bugs — the lesson is to understand where the moving parts are.
What to do if you were trading on the affected instance
If you had open trades on the RetoSwap instance around 2026-05-20:
- Check the official Haveno and RetoSwap operator channels for the current status and any recovery guidance.
- Do not act on unofficial "recovery" links or DMs — incident windows attract phishing.
- Wait for a formal postmortem before assuming final loss figures; early community numbers are estimates.
If you just need to move XMR while you wait, you can swap on a non-custodial service. The widget de intercambio en vivo handles BTC, XMR and 1,600+ pairs with no account or email. For the most common Monero route, see the Página del par BTC a XMR.
Preguntas Frecuentes
Q: Was Monero hacked in the Haveno / RetoSwap exploit?
A: No. The Monero protocol and cryptography were not affected. The flaw was in Haveno-based trading software on the RetoSwap instance — the application layer, not the XMR chain.
Q: Is my Monero in my own wallet safe?
A: XMR held in your own wallet was never in scope for this incident. The issue was confined to a specific peer-to-peer trading deployment, not the base network.
Q: How much was lost in the RetoSwap exploit?
A: Community reporting estimated around 7,000 XMR, with first malicious activity near 02:31 UTC on 2026-05-20. Treat this as a provisional figure until a formal postmortem confirms it.
Q: Can I still swap Monero safely?
A: Yes. Non-custodial swaps pass funds through without holding them, and the Monero network itself continued operating normally. You supply a receiving address; no account or KYC is needed.
Move XMR without an account
The Monero network kept running through this incident. If you need to swap, the GhostSwap homepage widget covers 1,600+ pairs with non-custodial pass-through and no signup.
GhostSwap no es un servicio financiero registrado.
